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Abstract
Agents often want to protect private information, while
at the same acting upon the information. These two desires
are in conﬂict, and this conﬂict can be modeled in strategic
games where the utility not only depends on the expected
value of the possible outcomes, but also on the information
propertiesof the strategy anagentuses. Inthis paper we de-
ﬁne two such games using the information theory concepts
of entropy and relative entropy. For both games we com-
pute optimal response strategies and establish the existence
of Nash equilibria.
1. Introduction
Information is valuable, and thus agents do not always
want to give it away. Both organisations and individuals of-
ten want to keep certain information private. At the same
time they might want to act upon it. Does this reveal the in-
formation? In this paper we study how agents should act if
they want to maximize their utility, while at the same time
not giving away too much information.We do this by deﬁn-
ing games in which the utility for each agent does not only
dependonthepayoffofthechosenaction,butalsoonthein-
formation properties of the used strategy. These games can
be applied to the following situations.
 Supermarkets and e-commerce shops register which
customer buys what. Customers know this and even
assist in this process by using so-called ‘bonus
cards’(Albert Heyn) or ‘club cards’(Tesco). Neverthe-
less many customers are worried about their privacy.
They would prefer it if the shop knew less about them.
Customers can do something to minimize the knowl-
edge of the shop. First of all they can make their
shopping less regular (i.e. randomly buy items so
that the shop is not sure which products the cus-
tomer actually uses). Secondly they can sign up
for more than one card(account) or swap cards be-
tween each other. On the Internet, deleting cookies
with random intervals and using a different IP num-
ber can have the same effect.
 In a second prize auction it is optimal to bid exactly
as much as you think the item is worth [11]. However,
youmighthave spent a lot of time to estimate the value
of the item, so you do not want to reveal your esti-
mate. Since your bid has to be public,it seems that you
might do better by biddingslightly random.By model-
ing this as a minimal information game, one can com-
pute how one should randomise. A similar argument
applieswhenyousend outanartiﬁcial agenttodoyour
shopping.If the agent is sent overan insecure network,
everyone can inspect the source code and thus the bid-
ding strategy of the agent. You might not want to send
an agent that is exactly optimal for your preferences,
in order to hide your preferences.
 Many public places are now guarded by closed cir-
cuit television systems. If you come to one such place
regularly, the camera attendants learn a lot about your
habits and thus about you. You feel this as a breach of
your personal privacy, and decide to hide your habits
by changing your behaviour often, for instance by go-
ing to different shops in a different order every time.
This situation can also be modeled as a minimal infor-
mation game. Again one can translate this example to
the domain of artiﬁcial agents and the Internet.
 Consider now the case of a criminal who wants to steal
from a shop guarded by a closed circuit television sys-
tem. He wants to look like a regular shopper, but has
different goals. He thus wants to behave so that he can
steal the most, while at the same time appear to be a
normal shopper. This can be modeled as a most nor-
mal game.
In this paper we deﬁne the two types of games mentioned,
the minimal information game and the most normal game.
Asthesimilarsettingofthelast twoexamplessuggest,these
two games are related. From these examples it should also
beclearthatweassumethatthestrategiesthatagentsuseare
publiclyknown.Thisassumptionmakesourresultsstronger(if you have privacy while your strategy is public, you will
have even more privacy when you can keep your strategy
secret).
Privacy has received a lot of attention from economists
or in a legal setting. Some key sources have been collected
onawebsite [1]. Thispaperdiffersfromtheseeconomicpa-
pers for two reasons. First of all we only deal with personal
information privacy, whereas the word ‘privacy’ also has
other meanings. The second difference is that these papers
try to explain the need for personal privacy in terms of eco-
nomicutility. Odlyzkofor instance relates privacyand price
discrimination[14]. This paperis written underthe assump-
tion that privacy is a fundamental value, that is not instru-
mental to any gain. Privacyitself is a goodcause that can be
enjoyed directly.
The games deﬁned in this paper use a soft approach to-
wards information. They deal with probabilities explicitly,
and can make subtle distinctions between possible, likely
and almost certain events. This soft approach can be con-
trasted to the hard approach of logic and model checking.
When taking a hard approach in protocol analysis, one is
onlyinterestedinwhatis possibleandwhatnot,witha com-
plete disregard for the relative likelihoods of different out-
comes. Both the soft and the hard approach have been used
for multi agent systems. The use of epistemic logic to un-
derstand the game of Cluedo [17] is an example of the hard
approach, as well as other logical approaches to reasoning
about knowledge and knowledge change [8, 4, 16, 3, 19].
Recent work on privacy preserving auctions [5] and work
on the Dining cryptographer problem [6] or the Russian
Cards problem [17, 18] can also be classiﬁed as ‘hard’. At
the same time there is some work on reasoning about un-
certainty [9, 10] that combines logic and a soft approach
to information. The soft approach is more precise than the
hard approach and in certain circumstances this is an ad-
vantage. The hard approach can tell us that agents do best
by randomising their strategy, but does not indicate the ex-
act probabilities of an optimal strategy. On the other hand
the higher level of abstraction of the hard approach makes
it easier to interpret the results.
Thelayoutofthis paperis as follows.Section2describes
a detailed example problem. The next section, section 3, in-
troduces basic information theory notions such as entropy.
Then we introduce strategic games in section 4. In section
5 we deﬁne minimal information games, and calculate the
best strategies in these games. In section 6 we do the same
for most normal games. Then we present our conclusions
in section 7. Finally section 8 is an appendix with a techni-
cal result that is not essential to the main argument of this
paper.
2. Example
The following problem serves as an example. Alice
(agent 1) needs to buy one box of breakfast cereals every
week. Every week she is faced with the following choice:
whethertobuyAllgrain(A),Barley(B)ofCornﬂakes(C).Al-
ice is not indifferent to which brand she eats. In fact she
likes A better than B and B better than C, as is indicated by
the following matrix of utilities.
action A B C
utility 3.0 2.0 1.0
If Alice is solely interested in maximising her expected
utility, she should buy A every day. However Alice knows
that the shop is watching her shopping behaviour closely,
and she is concerned about her privacy. She decides that
the decision that she makes should be private, and she can
achieve this by ﬂipping a coin and letting her decision de-
pend on this coin ﬂip. This way the shop cannot predict her
decision.
Alice ﬁrst attempts to use the following random strategy.
action A B C
probability 0.98 0.01 0.01
If Alice uses this strategy, then the shop does not know
anything about her decision: all three actions may occur
with positive probability. At the same time her expected
payoff is still very high, because the suboptimal actions oc-
curwitha verylowprobability.Problemsolved,so it seems.
But this is not the whole story. Even though the shop does
not gain any knowledge, it does gain information from this
strategy. If the shop learns, from repeated observation, that
Alice uses this strategy, then it is quite certain that she will
buy A. Thereforethe shop has gained quite a lot of informa-
tion. Therefore the indicated strategy is not the right strat-
egy if one analyses the situation using information theory.
One can argue that if Alice is concerned about her pri-
vacy,then that fact shouldbe representedin her utility func-
tion. This is not possible, because the utility function can
only express propertiesof single actions, whereas privacyis
a property of the whole strategy. One could also decide to
include an extra player that tries to guess Alice’s actions. It
is however not clear how one should estimate all the vari-
ables that one needs for this larger game. These considera-
tion have convinced us that it is easier to treat privacy as an
independent aspect of an agents utility.
3. Information Theory
Information theory is the ﬁeld of science that deals with
the measurement of information [7]. It has applications in
signal processing,communication networks, cryptography
and error correction codes. In this paper we use informa-
tion theory, and its central notion entropy, to estimate theamount of informationin strategies. Strategies will be mod-
eled as stochastic variables ranging over a ﬁnite set of ac-
tions, so we deﬁne entropy over stochastic variables. The
entropy of a stochastic variable is the amount of random-
ness in, the disorder of, or uncertainty about the value that
the variable will take. The concept of entropy has been in-
troduced by Shannon [15]. We deﬁne the following func-
tion f(x;y). Let lg be the base 2 logarithm.
f(x;y) =
8
<
:
0 if x = 0 and y = 0
1 if x 2 (0;1] and y = 0
 xlgy if x;y 2 (0;1]
Fora randomvariableX we deﬁne the entropyE(X), which
is measured in bits, in the following way.
E(X) =
X
k
f(p(X = k);p(X = k))
A random variable X with values in the domain
f1;2;:::;mg can be speciﬁed by giving a vec-
tor of length m with the probabilities of each value:
(p(X = 0);p(X = 1);:::;p(X = m)). For a mixed strat-
egy, the numbers f1;2;:::;mg represent the available ac-
tions. A requirement for probability measures on stochas-
tic variables is that the probabilities should add up to one.
We can thus only use vectors x that indeed add up to 1. De-
ﬁne the following sets Pm and Qm
Pm =fx 2 [0;1]mj
X
i
xi = 1g
Qm =fx 2 (0;1]mj
X
i
xi = 1g
The set Pm contains all vectors of length m that add up to 1,
and Qm contains all vectors that add up to 1 and do not take
the value 0. The set Qm is important in some of the proofs,
but often we work with the more general set Pm. We can
apply the notion of entropy to probability vectors x 2 Pm.
E(x) =
X
k
f(xk;xk)
In the context of strategies, a strategy with a higher entropy
leaves observers with more uncertainty, and thus gives the
agent that uses that strategy with more privacy. Below we
give ﬁve examples of entropy.The example strategy vectors
canall be seen as strategies overthree basic actions. A strat-
egy (a;b;c) contains the probability a of selection the ﬁrst
action, b for the second action and c for the third.
E((1=3;1=3;1=3)) =1:585 bits
E((0:5;0:25;0:25)) =1:5 bits
E((0:5;0:5;0)) =1 bit
E((0:98;0:01;0:01)) =0:161 bits
E((1:0;0;0)) =0 bits
Pure strategies, in which only one action gets a positive
probability, have an entropy of zero bits. The entropy func-
tion is bounded. It cannot be negative, and a vector x of
length m can have at most an entropy of lgm. It has this en-
tropy if all the entries xi are equal to 1=m, thus if the vec-
tor represents a stochastic variable with a uniform distribu-
tion.
The second idea that we use from information theory
is relative entropy [7]. The function r(x;y) can be used to
compare two probability vectors x;y 2 Pn. The underlying
ideais thatr(x;y) measureshowmuchdifferenceonewould
notice if probability vector x is used instead of y for select-
ing actions. In order to compute this difference, we add up
the differences for each action k. Using Bayes’ law one can
derive that the relative likelihood of x instead of y when ob-
servingthat x is chosen is xk=yk. This observationis the mo-
tive behind the following deﬁnition.
r(x;y) =
X
k
f(xk;yk=xk)
The function r almost behaves as a norm or distance func-
tion. It is never negative and only zero if x = y. It can be in-
ﬁnite, if for some k it is the case that xk > 0 and yk = 0.
The only difference between this function and a distance
or norm function is that r is not symmetric. In many cases
r(x;y) 6= r(y;x).
r((0:5;0:5);(0:75;0:25)) =0:2075 bits
r((0:75;0:25);(0:5;0:5)) =0:1887 bits
r((0:9;0:1);(0:75;0:25)) =0:1045 bits
r((0:75;0:25);(0:9;0:1)) =0:1332 bits
If x has a higher entropy than x0, then on average for a ran-
dom vector y it is the case that r(y;x) < r(y;x0). It is harder
to notice a difference between y and a high entropy vector x
than to notice a differencebetween y and a low entropyvec-
tor x0.
4. Strategic Games
Games can be presented in different forms. A very nat-
ural but detailed form is as an extensive game. In this form
there are a number if decision points in each play of the
game,and the outcomeis determinedby all these decisions.
This model is too detailed for our purposes. Therefore we
study games in strategic or normal form. In this form, each
agent has a number of strategies available at the beginning
of the game, and each agent independently picks a strategy.
We can calculate the payoff of the game directly, without
goinginto details which actions have been played.The gen-
eral deﬁnition for an n-agent normal form game is the fol-
lowing. We let  be the set of all agents, and assume that
 = f1;2;:::;ng for some n > 0.Deﬁnition 1. A game G is a tuple (;fSg;p) where for
each X 2  the set SX is a set of strategies for agent X, and
p : (S0  :::  Sn) ! R is a utility function.
Eachagenttries tomaximizeits utility.Thesets ofstrate-
gies do not have to be ﬁnite. A vector~ s = (s0;s1;:::;sn)
is a strategy vector for game G if G = (;fSg;p) and
for all i we have si 2 Si. If tj 2 Sj then we deﬁne
(s j;tj) = (s0;:::;sj 1;tj;sj+1;sn) as the strategy vector
where sj is replaced by tj.
We assume that every agent X always has a ﬁnite num-
ber of basic actions mX to choose from, and that the total
utility of a strategy somehow depends on the payoff of each
action. The payoff of each action is typically given in the
form of a matrix A. Since the number of agents may be
largerthantwo,we extendtheideaofa matrixto thefollow-
ing deﬁnition of a multi-matrix. A m1 m2 ::: mn multi-
matrix is a function A such that for each vector i1i2 :::in
with ij 2 f1;:::;mjg and X 2 f1;:::;ng, the function
A returns a real number AX(i0i1 :::in) 2 R. The expres-
sion A(i0i1 :::in) denotes a real vector v 2 R such that
v0 = A0(i0i1 :::in), v1 = A1(i0i1 :::in) etcetera.
For a given multi-matrix A one can deﬁne different
games.The simplest typeofgameis thepurestrategygame.
In this game the strategy of each agent X consists of a sin-
gle action aX and the payoff is then A(a0 :::aX). This deﬁ-
nition does not allow agents to play randomly. For our pur-
poses this deﬁnition is thus too restrictive. In a mixed strat-
egy game, the strategy of an agent is a probability distribu-
tion over the available actions. The payoff is than the ex-
pected (weighted average) value of A. This type of game is
deﬁned in the next deﬁnition.
The shorthand AX
i (~ s) denotes the expected payoff of ac-
tion i for agent X when the other agents use strategies from
~ s. It can be deﬁned in the following way.
AX
i (~ s) =
X
v2Y6=XSY
(sv1 :::svn)AX((v;i))
Deﬁnition 2. Let A be a m1  m2 :::  mn multi-matrix.
The mixed strategy game Mm(A) of A is a tuple (;fSXg;p)
where  = f1;2;:::;ng, the strategy sets are SX = PmX
and pX(~ s) =
P
i sX
i AX
i (~ s)
The fact that agents can play mixed strategies is explic-
itly deﬁned in this deﬁnition of a mixed strategy game. We
assume that all agents are equipped with random number
generators (coins, dice or whatever) so that they can ran-
domize their behavior exactly as speciﬁed in their strategy.
The central question in game theory has always been
the question about the ‘solution’ of a certain game. Intu-
itively the solution is the strategy vector containing the best
possible strategy for each agent. However not every game
has a unique solution in this sense. Therefore game theo-
rists work with different solution concepts. One of the best
known is the Nash Equilibrium.Everymixed strategy game
has a Nash equilibrium, but very often it is not unique.
For the next deﬁnition we need the function argmax
that returns all inputs that maximize a given func-
tion. argmaxx f(x) = fxj:9y : f(x) < f(y)g We use
the function argmax to deﬁne what a ‘good’ strat-
egy is: A good strategy is a strategy that returns a max-
imal utility. The function bX returns the best response
strategies for agent X for a given game and strategy vec-
tor.
Deﬁnition 3. Let (;fSg;p) be a game and~ s 2 (
Q
X SX)
a strategy proﬁle. The best response b(~ s) = b1(~ s)   
bn(~ s)) is deﬁned by
bX(~ s) = argmaxt pX((s X;t))
The set b(~ s) thus contains the strategy vectors t such that
tX is optimal if all opponents Y use the strategy sY. In a de-
cision theory problem we could assume that the strategy of
the opponents is ﬁxed. The set bX(~ s) is the set of best deci-
sions for agent X. In game theory things are not that simple,
because the other agents might want to change their strat-
egy once they learn that X uses a strategy in bX(~ s). How-
ever this interaction is nicely captured by the deﬁnition of a
Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4. Let (;fSg;p) be a game and~ s 2 (
Q
X SX)
a strategy proﬁle. The vector~ s is a Nash Equilibrium iff~ s 2
b(~ s)
Every mixed strategy game has at least one Nash equi-
librium [13]. There has been some discussion in the litera-
ture whether the notion of a Nash equilibrium needs to be
reﬁned. Several reﬁnements have been proposed, but none
of them have the appealing simplicity of the Nash equilib-
rium.
5. Minimal Information Games
The next deﬁnition of a minimal information game aims
to capture the following situation. Agents choose a mixed
strategy with two goals in mind. First of all they want a
highpayoff.Secondlytheywantprivacy.Theyfeel that they
havemore privacyif others are more uncertainabout the ac-
tion they will choose, and thus they prefer strategies with a
high entropy. These games thus model the situation where
agents have a fundamental desire for privacy.
We have to specify how the agent would like to trade pri-
vacy against payoff. This is governed by a parameter  > 0
that indicates the value of privacy. It expresses how much
expected payoff the agent is willing to trade against a bit of
privacy. The higher , the more the agent values privacy.
Deﬁnition 5. Let A be a m1m2 :::mn multi-matrix. The
minimal information game M
i (A) is a tuple (;fSXg;p)where  = f1;2;:::;ng, the strategy sets are SX = PmX
and pX(~ s) =
P
i sX
i AX
i (~ s) + E(sX)
The parameter regulateshowmuchall the agents value
the fact that there is uncertaintyover their next action. If we
take  = 0, then the game becomes a mixed strategy game:
M0
i (A) = Mm(A). As  approaches inﬁnity, the actual pay-
offbecomeslessandless important.Itwouldhavebeenpos-
sible to choose  differently for each agent, but this would
have made the deﬁnition less clear. One can always scale
the utilities in such a way that one value for  works for all
agents.
As an example, we consider the shopping game from the
introduction. This game has only one agent, that has three
options A;B;C with respective payoffs 3;2;1. The optimal
strategies for the minimal information game with different
values of  is given in the next table. It also lists the pay-
off Mm(A)(s) that the agent would get in the mixed strat-
egy game for the given strategy s and the value M
i (A)(s)
that the agent would get in the minimal information game.
 p1 p2 p3 Mm(A) M
i (A)
0:1 0:999 4  10 5 2  10 9 3:0 3:0
0:5 0:876 0:117 0:015 2:852 3:168
1:0 0:665 0:244 0:090 2:575 3:775
The best average value that the agent can get is 3:0 by
only choosing the ﬁrst action. However this would result in
noprivacy,because if the agentwoulduse this strategy,then
any observer knows beforehand what the agent will do ev-
ery day. For a low value of  the payoff M
i (A)(s) is very
close to this optimal value of 3. For higher values, the av-
erage payoff without entropy becomes lower. We could call
this the cost of privacy. From the table we can see that if
the agent values privacy at one unit per bit ( is expressed
in units per bit) then the agent does best by paying 0:425 in
order to obtain 0:775 bits of privacy.
The question is of course how we can calculate the
strategies that maximize the payoff in minimal information
games. For the linear functions of the mixed strategy games
this is trivial, but for more complicated functions this can
be difﬁcult.
Theorem 1. Let M
i (A) be a minimal information game,~ s
a strategy proﬁle and let b 2 bX(~ s). Then
bi =
2
 1A
X
i (~ s)
P
k 2 1AX
k (~ s)
Proof. We have to prove that the set bX(~ s) contains one el-
ement, and that that element is described by the given for-
mula.We ﬁrst show thatall pointsin b(~ s) areinteriorpoints.
Then we derive an equation that any best response must
satisfy, and show that this equation has a unique solution,
namely the one given in the theorem.
Take any vector ~ x 2 Pn n Qn. We are going to show
that there is a better vector ~ y, and thus ~ x is not a best re-
sponse. There is some i such that xi = 0 and some j such
that xj 6= 0. We will show that there is some  such that
~ y = ((x i;) j;xj  ) is a better vector: pX(~ y) > pX(~ x). To
show this, note that 
xipX(~ x) = +1 and 
xjpX(~ x) < +1.
Therefore, for sufﬁciently small , the gain from raising xi
must outweigh the potential loss from lowering xj. There-
fore for sufﬁciently small  we have that pX(~ y) > pX(~ x) and
thus~ x = 2 b(~ s).
Nowsupposethatb 2 bX(~ s).We knowthatb 2 Qn.Take
i;j 2 f1;2;:::;mg as two different indices. Since b is op-
timal, it should not be possible to increase pX by increasing
xi while decreasing xj, and therefore for any optimal point
it must be the case that 
xipX((~ s X;b)) = 
xjpX((~ s X;b)).
We can use this as a starting point for the following link of
equations. Fist we compute the derivative 
bipX((~ s X;b)).

bi
pX((~ s X;b)) =

bi
(
X
j
bjAX
j (~ s X;b) + E(~ b)) =
AX
i (~ s) + 

bi
(E(~ b))) =
AX
i (~ s) + ( lgbi   lge) =
AX
i (~ s)   lgbi   lge
Using this derivative one can reduce the equality given
above in the following way.

bi
pX((~ s X;b)) =

bj
pX((~ s X;b)) ,
AX
i (~ s)   lgbi = AX
j (~ s)   lgbj ,
A
X
i (~ s)   A
X
j (~ s) = lgbi   lgbj ,
2A
X
i (~ s)
2
AX
j (~ s) =
b
i
b
j
Since b 2 Pn it must be the case that b sums up to
P
i bi =
1. For any b 2 b(~ s) one can ﬁnd some positive constant c
such that bi = c  2
 1A
X
i (~ s). It now follows from the above
equation that for any bj it is the case that bj = c2
 1A
X
j (~ s).
We can now calculate
P
k bk = 1 = c
P
k 2 A
X
k (~ s) and thus
we know that 1
c =
P
k 2
 1A
X
k (~ s). Thus we have proven that
there is a unique point b 2 bX(~ s) which satisﬁes
bi =
2
 1A
X
i (~ s)
P
k 2 1AX
k (~ s)
Theorem 2. Every minimal information game M
i (A) has
a Nash equilibrium.Proof. Letf bethefunctionfromS0:::Sn toS0:::Sn
that returns the strategy vector with the best responses for
each agent. Thus f is the function that for each x returns the
unique point f(x) such that f(x) 2 b(x). This is a continu-
ous function. The set S0  :::Sn is topological isomorphic
to some closed sphere Bm. We can now use Brouwer’s ﬁxed
point theorem, which tells us that every continuous func-
tion f : Bm ! Bm must have a point x with f(x) = x [2].
We thus obtain a strategy vector x with f(x) = x, and thus
a point x such that x 2 b(x). This point is a Nash equilib-
rium.
6. Most normal strategies
So far we have discussed the situation in which the
agents try to protect their privacy against an opponentinter-
ested in theirnextaction. Inthis sectionwe lookanothersit-
uation,in which agents try to hide their preferences.The as-
sumption is here that an average strategy for ‘normal’ users
is given. One agent however has different preferences from
the normal users, but does not want to be identiﬁed as not
normal. Therefore the agent is searching for a strategy that
appears as normal as possible and maximizes its payoff at
the same time.
We approach the problem in exactly the same way as we
have approached the ﬁrst problem. We deﬁne most normal
games G
n (A) that depend on a parameter  expressinghow
important normal behaviour for the agent is.
Deﬁnition 6. Let A be a m1m2 :::mn multi-matrix, and
let~ s be a strategy vector. The most normal game M
n (A;~ s)
is a tuple (;fSXg;p) where  = f1;2;:::;ng, the strat-
egysets are SX = PmX andpX(~ s) =
P
i sX
i AX
i (~ s) r(sX;tX)
The parameter  again determines the trade-off between
selecting actions with a high payoff and acting normal.
Theorem 3. Let M
n (A;~ t) be a most normal game,~ s a strat-
egy proﬁle and let b 2 bX(~ s). Then
bi =
tX
i 2
 1A
X
i (~ s)
P
k tX
k 2 1AX
k (~ s)
Proof. Let M
n (A;~ t) be a most normal game, ~ s a strategy
proﬁle and X 2  an agent. Suppose that b 2 bX(~ s) is the
best response for agent X and let i be one of B’s action. If
ti = 0 and bi 6= 0, then the relative entropy becomes inﬁ-
nite, and the payoff thus inﬁnitely low. This cannot be op-
timal, thus if b maximizes the payoff, then ti = 0 implies
bi = 0. From this it follows that in case that if for some
ti = 1, then for any optimal strategy b we must have bi = 1.
Thus in this case the optimal point is not an interior point.
Consider now the case where ti > 0. We calculate the
derivative of the relative entropy function.

bi
r(b;t
X) =

bi
X
i
 bi(lgt
X
i  lgbi) = lgbi+lge lgt
X
i
We see that if bi > 0 approaches zero, then this derivative
becomesnegativeinﬁnity.If bi is sufﬁciently small, then we
would lower the payoff pX((~ s X;b)) by decreasing bi fur-
ther. Therefore for any optimal value of b, it cannot be the
case that bi = 0.
Since we have shown that ti = 0 implies bi = 0,
it remains for us to ﬁnd the optimal vector in the space
S = fb 2 [0;1]mj
P
i bi = 1^(ti = 0 ! bi = 0)g. The pre-
vious argument has shown that b is an interior point of this
set S. Such points can only be optimal if 
bipX((~ s X;b)) =

bjpX((~ s X;b)) for any pair i;j with ti;tj > 0. The next
computationwill showthatthereis a uniquepointsatisfying
this condition. Since any continuous function on a closed
domain must have a maximum, this point b will maximize
agent X’s payoff in the normal form game.
First we calculate the derivative.

bi
pX((~ s X;b)) =
AX
i (~ s)   

bi
r(b;tX) =
AX
i (~ s)   (lgbi + lge   lgtX
i ) =
A
X
i (~ s)   lgbi   lge + lgt
X
i
Now ﬁnd the points b where the derivatives 
bipX and 
bjpX
are equal.

bi
pX((~ s X;b)) =

bj
pX((~ s X;b)) ,
AX
i (~ s)   lgbi + lgtX
i = AX
j (~ s)   lgbj + lgtX
j ,
lg(bi=bj) = AX
i (~ s)   AX
j (~ s) + lg(tX
i =tX
j ) ,
bi
bj
=
tX
i 2
 1A
X
i (~ s)
tX
j 2
 1AX
j (~ s)
Again we can choose c such that bi = ctX
i 2
 1A
X
i (~ s) and
show that 1=c =
P
k tX
k 2
 1A
X
k (~ s). This leads to the next for-
mula.
bi =
tX
i 2
 1A
X
i (~ s)
P
k tX
k 2 1AX
k (~ s)
This formula gives us bi = 1 if ti = 1, and bi = 0 if ti = 0.
Therefore this formula gives us the optimal strategy for any
normal form game.
Discussion One consequence of the theorem is the follow-
ing observation. If a certain action i is not considered by
normal agents (tX
i = 0) then the non-normal agent should
not consider action i either (bi = 0). If one had used a hard,logical approach one could have reached the same conclu-
sion. In the most extreme case one can consider the case
where normal agents use a pure strategy. In that case the
non-normal agent has to use the same pure strategy. If the
non-normal agent values all actions equally, he also does
best by copying the normal strategy. In all other cases the
best strategy for the non-normal agent is different. Appar-
ently the agent does best by always taking some risk and
getting a better payoff.
7. Conclusion
We have deﬁned two new kinds of games. First of all
minimal information games, in which agents want to max-
imize the uncertainty that observers have over their next
move. Secondly most normal games, in which agents want
to behave as similar as possible to an existing ‘normal’
agent, while maximizing their payoff. In order to do so we
borrowedtheconceptsentropyandrelativeentropyfromin-
formation theory. In two theorems we have shown what the
optimal best responses are in these games. These turn out
to be unique in each situation, and to depend continuously
on the payoff matrix and the opponent strategies. From this
continuity one can derive that Nash equilibria exist in these
games.
Minimal information games can be used to analyse sit-
uations with privacy-minded agents. If agents attach some
value of privacy, the best strategy always gives them some
privacy.
In most normal games, the situation is slightly more
complicated. How well the non-normal agent X can do de-
pends very much on the strategy that normal agents use. If
the normal agents use a pure strategy, then X has no choice
but to adopt the same strategy. The situation however be-
comes a lot better if the normal agents are privacy-minded.
In that case they choose a high-entropy strategy, and this
leaves the wanting-to-be-normalagent a lot of room to pur-
sue its own agenda.
One can extend the work in these games in several ways.
First of all it would be interesting to look at experimental
data, to see whether most-normal or minimal-information
strategies are used in the reality. Secondly one could imple-
ment these strategies in order to obtain privacy. The ques-
tion is then whether the soft approach to privacy is what
users want.
On a theoretical side, it seems that these games give ap-
proximations to the Nash equilibrium with very nice tech-
nical properties. Two of these properties are continuity of
the best response function and the fact that best responses
are always interior. In the appendixof this paper we already
use minimal information games to deﬁne a reﬁnement of
the Nash equilibrium, as an example how these properties
are technically useful.
8. Appendix:Equilibrium Reﬁnements
The world hardly needs another reﬁnement of the Nash
equilibrium.Nevertheless a reﬁnement is deﬁned in this ap-
pendix,solelyinordertomakesometechnicalobservations.
By introducing minimal information games we have in-
troduced a game with a new kind of payoff function. For
small values of  the game M
i (A) is very similar to the
mixed strategy game Mm(A). One can, with some imagi-
nation, see a Nash equilibrium x of M
i (A) as a solution
of Mm(A). In that case, one has a new solution concept for
mixed strategy games Mm(A).
Such a solution x of some game M
i (A) is not a Nash
equilibrium Mm(A), but an approximation of it. How good
this approximation is depends on the parameter . We can
deﬁne a Nash equilibrium by letting  approach zero. This
way, we can deﬁne a ’minimal information’ equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 7. The strategy proﬁle x is a minimal informa-
tion equilibrium of Mm(A) iff there is a sequence 0;1;:::
of positive numbers such that limi!1 i = 0, a sequence
x0;x1;::: such that xi is a Nash equilibrium of M
i
i (A) and
limi!1 xi = x.
Theorem 4. Every mixed strategy game Mm(A) has a min-
imal information equilibrium.
Proof. Deﬁne the sequence0;1;::: by i = 1=i.This se-
quence converges to zero. By theorem 2 each game M
i
i (A)
has some Nash equilibriumyi. The strategy space S0:::
Sn is a closed and boundedsubset of Rm for some m. There-
fore, since any bound and closed subset of Rm is com-
pact [20] we derive that every sequence in S0  :::  Sn
has some converging subsequence. Let x0;x1;::: be a con-
verging subsequence of y0;y1;::: and let x be the limit
of limi!1 xi. Let 0;1;::: be the corresponding subse-
quence of 0;1;:::, so that xi is a Nash equilibrium of
M
i
i (A). When  converges to inﬁnity, the payoff function
of M
i
i (A) converges uniformly to the payoff function of
Mm(A). Since xi is always maximizing each agents payoff
in M
i
i (A), it must be the case that x maximizes the pay-
off of Mm(A) for each agent. Therefore x is a Nash equilib-
rium of Mm(A).
Every minimal information equilibrium is a proper equi-
librium as deﬁned by Myerson, and therefore it is also a
trembling hand perfect equilibrium [12]. These reﬁnements
can thus be motivated (if one wants to) by an appeal to pri-
vacy minded agents. Perhaps there are other applications
where one needs a response concept that selects interior so-
lution points, for instance to avoid division by zero. In that
case the minimal information best responses seem suitable.References
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